Why Conservatives Lose by Design

Conservative lose. They lose over and over again. In Western-style party-politics, they seem to always be playing catch-up, not able to follow the pace of their progressive opponents. And people do notice those losses. Conservative voters tend to relentlessly complain that their representatives are not strong enough, not firm enough, not good enough, and therefore not successful enough. 

Electoral wins of conservative parties or candidates are often celebrated as great wins which finally mean an advance in moving ahead with the cause of conservatism. But those celebrations are typically quite swiftly turned into repeated disappointments, as those conservative parties or figureheads fail at delivering on their promises.

There seems to be a pattern. That’s not news; it’s something many conservatives have been pointing out. But their explanations of why are often either incomplete or wrong entirely.

The first thing to note is that there is no clear definition of conservatism. I will outline one definition, which I think is useful, while acknowledging there can be many others. Many conservatives might claim that in addition to my view of conservatism, there are other conservative values and goals one needs to take into account. That is a discussion for another time.

In contrast with other political movements or ideologies, conservatism often depends on its surroundings - i.e. where and when that particular conservatism happens to find itself. At the basis of conservatism is the stress on tradition and continuity, on placing intrinsic value on what has been handed down to us in the present by those in the past. What this leads to is a conservative presumption against change and innovation. What is (and has been) in place is tried and tested, whereas what is proposed could be risky. That doesn’t mean that change and innovation are refused outright, but that a higher standard is required of them, to place a premium on that which is already familiar and tested by time.

This means that often, conservatism is only definable, policy-wise, in relation to other political movements and ideologies in that particular space and time. Therefore, if the present situation changes, conservatism also changes. “That’s right, I’m a conservative.”

It is important to note that conservative movements in practice rarely aim at a concrete point in history or in the past they would wish to recreate. They might be inspired by past role models or historical sources of wisdom and knowledge, but re-modelling society to resemble an image from the past is typically not the goal. 

This might point to a deeper issue. In our world today, conservatives cannot aim at recreating a point in the past which would resemble a better society more than the present one. This is because, over the past two centuries, the left has been exceptionally successful at instilling its framing of history into the official record as well as our modern minds. The left sees history as a process of constant enlightenment, of a never-ending march towards a brighter future. What is in the past is old, outdated, obsolete, uncivilised, barbaric, and, most importantly, now overcome for the better. 

The view of history as firmly moving forward, bringing ever-increasing societal progress, is now deeply ingrained in the Western brain, whether one wants it to be or not. Therefore, picking something from the past and presenting that as one’s aim rather than a hypothetical point in the future is counter-intuitive. It would feel weird if conservatives tried to do that. Why, after all, would your ideal end-goal be somewhere in the middle on the line from bad to good, why would it be worse than what we have now, and why wouldn’t it simply be the better, or best, somewhere ahead of us?

Such a pickle causes conservatives to appear to be without a vision. In politics, they are often seen as just stalling - not doing anything, not willing to address societal problems, not willing to act to make the world better in some way. They are often criticised for not offering meaningful proposals, just reacting to what others bring to the table, often simply appropriating a more moderate version of others’ suggestions. That is why Michael Malice’s characterization of them is becoming ever more popular - “conservatism is progressivism driving the speed limit.” Conservatives are the managers and facilitators of change, making sure that the inevitable progress of history is not too fast and not too rash.

When conservatives notice this and attempt to have a vision of some kind, they usually do it by allying themselves with progressives of one flavour or another. The progressive input in that vision is badly needed, because a vision which in some ways goes back in time - and is therefore in a certain way static - is a vision where things don’t get better over time but simply stay good, and remain precisely as they should be. But we live in an age of ‘growth’ - a concept to which our understanding of society, politics, and history is, for now, inseparably tied.

As an aside, those on the left today who argue for a so-called ‘de-growth’ or ‘post-growth’ society are, ironically, playing into the hands of conservatives and are pulling on the same end of the rope. They have no chance of succeeding, either.

In political science circles, the role that conservative parties actually perform in modern party-politics has been endlessly analysed. One of the most appealing explanations, at least for me, is the idea of them being a vehicle for the legitimation of societal changes proposed by others - most often the progressives. This is how the process goes: 

In this model, conservatives are automatically the opposition, whereas progressives are the ‘proposition’. This means that conservatives have a particular role in the process. Whether they like it or not, they end up acting not as a counterweight to the other side, but as a stamp on the other side’s suggestions whenever it is needed.

As an analogy, imagine the process of the Environmental Impact Assessment that is undertaken in virtually all Western countries before any larger-scale construction project can be started. The stated role of this Impact Assessment is obviously to assess the impact of the project. But the real role is to create a consensus and manufacture legitimacy. You need to go through some hoops and complications, but when that is done, you get a stamp for your project - now you can go ahead with what you’d like.

When such a stamp is given, subsequent protest voices are muted. They have a shaky leg to stand on - after all, you went through all the proper channels and fulfilled all the requirements, so what you’re doing is now legitimate. Protesting against such a legitimate undertaking is not only futile but produces bad optics as well. Those protesting are then simply being difficult and trying to overturn the consensus that everyone agreed on.

Just as those tying themselves to trees in Germany to prevent a highway being built look bad, after all those proper environmental considerations had been made, so do ‘difficult’ conservatives look bad when they try to protest something that had previously been ‘achieved’ by progressives to which they had given their stamp. It is no surprise that the reforms that progressives enact are almost never reversed, even when conservatives later regain power.

Imagine the hypothetical situation in which the process goes the other way around - starting with conservatives making their own proposal - as it sometimes happens. A policy change suggestion is introduced by them, but because conservatives are meant to serve as the perpetual opposition, progressives simply cannot be an opposition to them if you try to reverse the roles. Instead, then, when conservatives introduce a proposal, there can be no civil discussion and consensus. And without that, the end result becomes less legitimate. The situation becomes a conflict where there can only be at most one side that wins.

Even if the conservatives win, then, that win is never secure. Progressives will protest when a conservative proposal is introduced. Progressives will protest when it is being pushed through against their will. Progressives will protest when the proposal is enacted. And progressives will protest even afterwards - when it is already in place and supposed to be ‘a done deal’. 

Because, in the eyes of progressives, that conservative win had never been achieved legitimately in the first place, they are in a good position to attempt to change it back whenever they get the first chance to do so. Plus, their consciences demand it. And so they often do. It is sufficient to say: “We never agreed to this, the policy was enacted illegitimately, against the will of the people.” This narrative is very likely to succeed, because, after all, progressives in this situation are the ones correcting the course of history back to the straight upward-sloping line in the minds of the people living in the progressive narrative of history they had created.

Therefore, conservatives do not lose because they would have worse ideas, worse people, worse strategists, etc. on their side. They lose because they are designed to be the perpetual losers in the democratic party-system. Their position in that system is not to offer an alternative to someone else’s proposals; it is to regulate others’ proposals and then legitimise them by giving them their blessings. The structure of this system is Hegelian, and progressives are always the thesis, building upon every previous synthesis.

Conservatives lose because they don’t realise that this is the position they are in - and so they cannot overcome it. They typically think that they just need to be better, stronger, more forceful in the parliamentary game; and that when they are stronger than their opponents, they will finally start winning. But that is futile and will achieve nothing for them - only that they will be simply laughed at and swept aside when history comes to judge them.